Abstract-The paper presents an extension of cumulantbased control theory over a finite horizon for a class of multiplayer pursuit-evasion wherein the evolution of the states of the game in response to adversarial strategies selected by pursuit and evasion teams from the efficient Pareto sets of admissible strategies is described by a stochastic linear differential equation and an integral-quadratic performance-measure. Both cooperation within each team and competition between the teams presumably exist. A direct dynamic programming approach for the Mayer optimization problem is used to solve for a multi-cumulant and Pareto-based solution when the members in each team optimally implement collective strategies and effectively shape the distribution of their Chi-squared random measures of performance associated with this special class of stochastic multi-player pursuit-evasion games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1950s, the work of Issacs [3] in deterministic pursuit-evasion game of a single pursuer and a single evader with perfect information and common knowledge has been greatly extended to pursuit-evasion with multiple pursuers and multiple evaders. Recent developments [4] , [7] and important applications therein respectively treat probabilistic discrete-time and continuous-time problems with averaged performance indices. To the best knowledge of the authors, there hasn't yet been any work done for stochastic multiplayer pursuit-evasion wherein the members in each team implement collective strategies to optimize their realized performance distribution beyond the traditional long-run average performance while in the competition with the other rival team and Nature's mixed random strategies. To address this completely unexplored research area, the present work presumes a cognitive model of Nature actions against which pursuit and evasion teams evaluate how they are doing. In effect pursuit and evasion teams apply criteria of performance to their coalitive decision strategies in response to almost all realizations generated by Nature. Such criteria are concerned with the actions imposed by Nature. Both rival teams try to anticipate what Nature is going to do in the future and they choose their actions to optimize performances given their anticipations. In other words, pursuit and evasion teams are conscious that their respective criteria of performance are dependent on Nature's mixed random realizations in the course of pursuit and evasion. Therefore, the minimization of the average measures of performance guarantees a priori nothing about the actual performance distributions because This work was sponsored in part by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under LRI 00VS17COR. Correspondences should be directed to the email: AFRL.RVSV@kirtland.af.mil Nature ultimately decides all the realizations of environmental interferences for the underlying stochastic process.
This paper is organized to provide innovative answers to the emerging unresolved questions: 1) What if pursuit and evasion teams are not reasonably content with such a limited average measure of performance as often seen in all existing state-of-the-art literatures? 2) Is there an efficient and tractable method that calculates exactly higher-order characteristics of the performance distribution? and 3) What new team strategies may be defined to directly influence the shared and conflicting performance distribution and to guarantee its robustness?
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
For analytical tractability, a class of differential games against Nature whose interaction dynamics of pursuers and evaders are linear and performance measures are quadratic functions of the states and controls is considered. Specifically, a pursuit-evasion game with team P with m P pursuers, identified as m 1 , . . . , m P , and team E with m E evaders, identified as m 1 , . . . , m E , in an open subset of Hilbert space. Denote by
and the heterogenous interactions for the multi-player stochastic pursuit-evasion modeled on [t 0 , t f ] is given by
where the aggregate coefficients
) and a sample path realization from Nature is a traditional performance-measure J X i : X ×U P × U E → R + for which member i in team X attempts to optimize in presence of the other rival team's confrontations
subject to the dynamics of the differential game (3) where Within team X, all the members decide to act cooperatively via a negotiating solution that comes from a coalitive Pareto decision subset U X C of the class of permissible decisions U X . This solution is particularly attractive with the property that if any other solution is used at least one of the team members is penalized in the sense that his realized performance is worse, or all the members do the same.
Definition 1: Efficient Pareto Control Decisions. For any random realization ω X ∈ Ω X drawn by Nature, the coalitive strategiesû
.
The point (J In the subsequent analysis, the set of parameters, W X represents for team cooperative profiles ξ
is Pareto efficient. Since the performance-measure (4) is a convex function on the convex set U P C × U E C with the convex constraint (3), the problem of solving for a set of efficient Pareto decisions within each team X with a vector-valued performancemeasure criterion is equivalent to the problem of solving an m X − 1 parameter family of optimal control problems with scalar cost criteria [5] . 
However, there are, in general, many Pareto solutions which depend on parameters ξ X and Nature's actions ω X . This observation raises the question as to which one is the best. To address this question, the present work therefore suggests an emerging arena of what is called performance robustness against Nature which is now explored by the cumulant-based control theory, in conjunction with the Pareto efficiency.
Then, the aggregate performance on a realization can be rewritten as
The negotiating performance-measure (8) associated with team X becomes
In fact, the game is zero-sum only if
Q f , and
Replacing these insights into (9), one obtains the realized performance-measure for the pursuit-evasion
In addition, the aggregate system (3) in the absence of uncertain disturbances is assumed to be uniformly exponentially stable. For instance, there exist positive constants η 1 and η 2 such that the pointwise matrix norm of the closed-loop state transition matrix for pursuit-evasion satisfies the inequality
As shown in [6] , all cumulants of the IQF random measure of performance have the same quadratic-affine functional form given the linear-quadratic structure of the system considered therein. This common form of the cumulants facilitates the definition of a cumulant-based performance index and the formulation of an optimization problem involving a finite number of the cumulants of J ξ . Therefore, it is reasonable to restrict the search for decision strategies to linear time-varying decision laws by the rules of action
where
) are admissible gains for teams P and E. With the decision strategies (11)-(12), the dynamics of pursuit-evasion (3) becomes
together with its realized measure of performance
Clearly then, the performance-measure (14) is now a random variable with Chi-squared type. Hence, the uncertainty of shared performance distribution for conflicting teams must be assessed via a complete set of higher-order statistics beyond the statistical averaging. Next compact and robust results not only offer a tractable method for higher-order characteristics of (14) but also allow the incorporation of a class of linear feedback decision syntheses as being utilized in the cumulant-based control optimization.
Theorem 1: Cumulants in Multi-Player Pursuit-Evasion. Suppose the multi-player pursuit-evasion is described by (13)- (14) where (A, B P ) and (A, B E ) are uniformly stabilizable. Two rival teams respectively choose coalitive decisions
For any given k ∈ Z + , ξ P ∈ W P , and ξ E ∈ W E , the k th cumulant in multi-player pursuit-evasion is given by
where the cumulant-generating components {H(α, i)}
and {D(α, i)} k i=1 evaluated at α = t 0 satisfy the following differential equations (with the dependence of H(α, i) and D(α, i) upon the admissible gains
together with
where the terminal-value conditions
III. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
Suffice it to say here that all the performance-measure cumulant values (15) depend in part of the known initial condition x(t 0 ). Although different states x(t) will result in different values for the "cost-to-go" where (14) is redefined by replacing the lower integration limit t 0 with the running time variable α, the cumulant values are however, functions of time-backward evolutions of the cumulant-generating components H(α, i) and D(α, i) that totally ignore all the intermediate values x(t). This fact therefore makes the new optimization problem particularly unique as compared with the more traditional dynamic programming class of investigations. Consequently, the time-backward trajectories (16)-(18) should be considered as the "new" dynamical equations from which the resulting Mayer optimization [2] and associated value function in the framework of dynamic programming therefore depend on these "new" states H(α, i) and D(α, i), not the classical states x(t) as the people may often expect.
In the subsequent development, the subset of symmetric matrices of the vector space of all n × n matrices with real elements is denoted by S n where n 
, and the actions are given by
For a compact formulation, the product mappings follow
Thus, the dynamic equations of motion (16)-(18) can be rewritten as follows
where H(t f ) = (Q f , 0, . . . , 0) and D(t f ) = (0, . . . , 0). Note that the product system uniquely determines H and D once the admissible decision gains K P and K E are specified. Hence, H and D are considered as H(·,
, respectively. The performance index in cumulant-based control optimization can now be formulated in the admissible decision gains K P and K E . Definition 2: Performance Index. Fix k ∈ Z + and μ = {μ i ≥ 0} k i=1 with μ 1 > 0. Then for given (t 0 , x 0 ), ξ P ∈ W P , and ξ E ∈ W E , the performance index φ 0 : {t 0 } × (S n ) k × R k → R + for the cumulant-based optimization is defined as follows
where the parametric design freedom μ i mutually chosen by adversarial teams represent different levels of influence as they deem important to the realized performance distribution and cumulant-supporting solutions 
with μ 1 > 0, the sets of admissible decision strategies If the game admits a saddle-point equilibrium in pure strategies, there exist K
which is also bounded from above by the upper bound
,ξ E ;μ are nonempty, compact and convex and the continuous performance index
is strictly convex in K P and strictly concave in K E , the pursuit-evasion admits a saddle-point equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: The sets of pure strategies
and K E t f ,H f ,D f ;ξ P ,ξ E ;μ are nonempty, compact and convex. What remains is to show the continuous function
is strictly convex in K P and strictly concave in K E . It can be done by aggregating the supporting equations (16)-(17) as follows
The fundamental theorem of calculus and stochastic differential rule applied to x T (τ )Λ(τ )x(τ ) yield the result
After some manipulations, it follows that
Note that an integral form of the solution of (18) is given by
In view of the definition of Λ(·), it is then easy to see that
Hence, the performance index (21) is now rewritten as
Replacing the results (22) and (24) into (23), it yields
Hence, the continuous function (21) is strictly convex in K P and strictly concave in K E . Therefore, the pursuit-evasion game considered here admits a saddle-point equilibrium in accordance of Proposition 3.3 in [1] . Next, one may state the optimization problem for the stochastic multi-player pursuit-evasion.
Definition 4: Optimization Problem.
with μ 1 > 0. Then, the optimization problem for multi-player pursuit-evasion over [t 0 , t f ] is given by
As a tenet of transition from the principle of optimality, a family of games based on different starting points is now of concerned. With an intermission of time, ε in mid-play considered here, the path has reached some definitive point at its commencement. There exist some potential (H, D) which may be reached at the end of the intermission for all possible choices of (K P , K E ). Suppose that for each endpoint, the game beginning there has already been solved. Then, the value function V(ε, H, D) resulting from each choice of (K P , K E ) is known, and they are to be so chosen as to render it minimax. As the duration of the intermission approaches t f together with the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium, it leads to the necessary and sufficient Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) condition.
Definition 5: Playable Set. Let playable set Q be defined as
Let (ε, Y, Z) be any interior point of the playable set Q at which the value function V(ε, Y, Z) is differentiable. If there exists a saddle point (
is satisfied together with
and vec(·) the vectorizing operator of enclosed entities.
IV. SADDLE-POINT DECISION STRATEGIES Recall that the optimization problem being considered herein is in "Mayer form" and can be solved by applying an adaptation of the Mayer form verification theorem of dynamic programming given in [2] . Often, it is required to denote the terminal time and states of a family of optimization problems as (ε, Y, Z) rather than (t f , H f , D f ). That is, for ε ∈ [t 0 , t f ], the states of (19)- (20) For any given interior point (ε, Y, Z) of the reachable set Q at which the real-valued function W(ε, Y, Z)
; R) are yet to be determined. Moreover, the time derivative of W(ε, Y, Z) can be obtained as below
The substitution of this candidate for the value function into the HJI equation (29) and making use of the result (30) yield 0 ≡ min
Differentiating the expression within the bracket of (31) with respect to K P and K E yield the necessary conditions for an extremum of the performance index (21) on [t 0 , ε]
where the normalized weights μ r μ i /μ 1 with μ 1 > 0. Substituting the gain expressions (32) and (33) into the right member of the HJI equation (31) yields the value of minimax
It is now necessary to exhibit functions
which will render the left side of (34) equal to zero for ε ∈ [t 0 , t f ], when {Y i } k i=1 are evaluated along solution trajectories of the cumulant-generating equations. Studying the expression (34) reveals the following results
will work. Furthermore, at the boundary condition, it is necessary to have
Thus, matching the boundary condition yields the corresponding initial value conditions E i (t 0 ) = 0 and T i (t 0 ) = 0 for the equations (35)-(37). Applying the decision gains specified in (32) and (33) along the solution trajectories of the equations (19)- (20), these equations become Riccati-type. Thus, whenever these corresponding equations admit solu-
and
satisfying the equations (35)-(37) are then assured. By comparing the parametric equations (35)-(37) to those Riccati-type equations, one recognizes that these equations are related to one another by
for which the sufficient condition (29) of the verification theorem is satisfied. Therefore, the feedback decision gains for pursuit team P , (32) and evader team E, (33) optimizing the performance index stated in (21) become optimal
Theorem 4: Strategies for Multi-Player Pursuit-Evasion. Consider the multi-player pursuit-evasion game as described by (13)- (14) where the pairs (A, B P ) and (A, B E ) are uniformly stabilizable. Fix ξ P ∈ W P , ξ E ∈ W E , k ∈ Z + , and μ = {μ i ≥ 0} k i=1 with μ 1 > 0. Then, the saddle-point equilibrium is achieved by non-cooperative decision gains
μ r H * r (α) (40)
where μ r mutually chosen by rival teams represent various robustness levels of the common performance distribution and the optimal solutions {H * T û P * C (t) = (K P P ) * (t)x P * (t) + (K P E ) * (t)x E * (t) , (44)
where the components of Pareto-efficient decision gains V. CONCLUSIONS This paper dealt with a multi-player pursuit-evasion differential game modeled in stochastic and adverse environments. Matrix differential equations for generating statistics of the standard integral-quadratic performance-measure used in this game were derived. A direct dynamic programming approach was used to solve for a novel saddle-point solution that can address both decision strategy selection and performance robustness. These results are expected to make new theoretical contributions and performance assessment tools for statistical learning and stochastic game-theoretic communities.
